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1994 to 2012, we find that fund flow is negatively related to the changes in 10-year Treasury
and Moody’s Baa bond yields one month ahead. The relation is still pronounced after
controlling for other determinants of yield changes, including the amount of arbitrage
capital available in the economy, suggesting a non-trivial effect of flow-induced hedge
fund trading on bond yields. Flow impact on corporate bonds is further amplified during
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1 Introduction
Hedge funds are active investment managers, which are only loosely regulated. They can take
leverage, short sell, and implement various dynamic trading strategies with frequent portfolio
re-balancing. The total size of the industry exceeded USD $3 trillion as of the end of the first
quarter of 2017.1The capital concentration in the largest funds makes it possible for them to
move prices of the assets they trade away from the fundamental values by affecting the demand
for these assets. Using long equity positions of hedge funds, as reported in the 13F filings to
the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), Ben-David et al. (2013) show that hedge fund
trading is likely to be a cause of abnormal price moves around quarter ends of stocks they hold.
The bond market (especially for corporate bonds) is less liquid than the equity market. Given
the large trading volume attributed to hedge funds in these markets2 and the importance of
the fixed income markets for other investors (e.g., pension funds), the question of the potential
impact on bond prices by hedge fund trading is of great importance.
Previous research, however, has mostly focused on hedge fund links to equity markets. The
research on the effects of hedge fund trading on bond markets is rather scarce, and the links
between hedge fund trading and bond markets are often only investigated indirectly. Choi
et al. (2010) focus on the convertible bond market, and find that the flow of convertible bond
arbitrage hedge funds explains the number of convertible bonds issued. Kruttli et al. (2015)
show that the aggregate liquidity of hedge funds predicts future returns on bonds, among other
assets. Fleckenstein et al. (2014) suggest that the amount of arbitrage capital measured by
flows into the hedge fund industry leads to decreasing profitability of a trading strategy that
exploits Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS)-Treasury bond relative mispricing.
Our paper further extends this body of literature and examines the impact of flow-induced
hedge fund trading on the fixed income market and the resulting predictability of bond yields.
We consider a relatively illiquid corporate bond market and a highly liquid Treasury bond
market, and proxy their performance by monthly changes in Moody’s Baa corporate bond
yield and monthly changes in the 10-year Treasury bond yield. Despite the differences in their
1According to Hedge Fund Research, Inc., https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/index.php?fuse=
products-irglo.
2E.g., hedge funds purchase up to 75% of the convertible bonds (Choi et al., 2010), and account for 20% of
the trading volume in the U.S. Treasury bond market (Financial Times, August 11, 2010).
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liquidity, both types of bonds are relatively risky within their respective asset classes and are
likely to be held long by hedge funds.
At the same time, hedge funds often engage in long-short strategies. Thus, their trading
may have opposite effects on prices of the long and short legs of such strategies. We consider
three widely used bond arbitrage trading strategies, the profitability of which depends on the
spreads between various pairs of fixed income securities. In particular, we consider changes
in yield spread between on-the-run and off-the run bonds (Krishnamurthy, 2002), constant
maturity swap rate and constant maturity treasury rate (Duarte et al., 2007), and TIPS and
Treasury bonds (Fleckenstein et al., 2014).
In contrast to previous research focusing on percentage fund flow, in this study we use dollar
flow, which can better capture the magnitude of hedge fund trading and external liquidity
shocks. We scale dollar fund flow by the U.S. GDP as of the end of the previous year to control
for the exponential growth of the industry with respect to the size of the economy and the rate
of inflation.
Our paper contributes to the discussion on the potential impact of hedge funds on financial
markets. It provides strong empirical evidence on the predictability of changes in bond yields
by hedge fund flows, pointing towards a non-negligible effect of flow-induced hedge fund trading
on prices of fixed income securities. We make several contributions to the literature. First, we
find that dollar flow to hedge funds is negatively related to changes in yields of 10-year Treasury
bonds and Baa-rated bonds one month ahead. Second, our results point to differences in the
economic mechanism of the link between fund flows and Treasury and corporate bond yield
changes. The effect on Treasury bonds is driven by inflow, suggesting that hedge funds may
(temporarily) allocate excess cash to safe government securities, pushing their prices upwards.
But it is both outflow and inflow that contribute to predictability of corporate bond yield
changes, suggesting a direct price effect of flow-induced trading. The impact on corporate bonds
is further amplified during periods of decreasing market liquidity, which is consistent with the
fire-sale hypothesis and liquidity spiral proposed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Next,
we show that this predictability is largely associated with inflow and outflows of the largest
25% of hedge funds. The predictive power increases over time with the growth of the hedge
fund industry. The strongest impact in recent years is linked to outflows from large bond-trend
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following hedge funds. Last but not least, fund flow predicts convergence in constant maturity
treasury bond yield and swap rate, making the Treasure-swap spread arbitrage trading strategy
less profitable. A similar effect is found for TIPS-Treasury spread for 30-year bonds. These
findings indicate that hedge funds exploit arbitrage opportunities on fixed income markets, and
reduce mispricing.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to a vast literature discussing potential links between hedge fund activity
and financial market performance. In particular, Kruttli et al. (2015) show that the aggregate
liquidity of hedge funds, proxied by the average hedge fund return serial correlation coefficient,
has predictive power for future returns on stock, bond, and currency indices. Kang et al.
(2014) link hedge fund trading and stock-idiosyncratic volatility. Choi et al. (2010) investigate
convertible bond issuance and convertible bond arbitrage hedge funds. These arbitrageurs
are primary purchasers on that market and the inflow to funds is a funding resource for the
purchase. The authors find that the flow of convertible bond arbitrage hedge funds explains
the number of the convertible bonds issued.
Although the data on detailed hedge fund holdings are not available, previous research has
analysed the impact of reported equity holdings of large hedge fund investment companies on
equity markets using 13F filings submitted to the SEC. Ben-David et al. (2012) find that the
changes in stock holdings are mainly driven by hedge fund flow. Given the substantial sell-off in
hedge fund equity holdings during the financial crisis of 2007–2008, clients’ redemption is likely
to be the main reason for hedge funds’ stock selling. The authors claim that (institutional)
clients of hedge funds fear fund managers may lock up the money if funds perform poorly.
Therefore, these clients tend to be very sensitive to market turbulence and, as a result, money
withdrawal becomes more severe than in other investment vehicles such as mutual funds. In
addition, Ben-David et al. (2012) suggest that hedge funds reallocate their capital from stocks to
sovereign and corporate bonds, as the correlations of hedge fund return and the corresponding
asset indices increased during the financial crisis.
Jiao (2013) investigates hedge fund holdings reported in the 13F forms between 2000 and
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2009 and finds that they are positively related to equity returns one quarter ahead, prior to 2007.
Jylha et al. (2014) show that hedge funds provide liquidity to the stock market, often acting
as contrarian traders. Cella et al. (2013) study the trading behaviour of the 13F institutional
investors, including mutual funds and hedge funds. They find that institutional investors with
short trading horizons react more strongly to market shocks than investors with long trading
horizons. Upon realization of the market shock, short-horizon investors sell large amounts of
their stock holdings, and the resulting fire sales create price pressure in the stock market. The
fire sales also affect the prices of other assets held by the same institutional investors (Coval
and Stafford, 2007).
Chan et al. (2005) show that returns on the S&P 500 index, a synthetic bank index, a
bond index, and several other indices are related to hedge funds performance. Boyson et al.
(2010) apply the Co-movement Box proposed by Cappiello et al. (2014) and find contagion
between hedge fund returns and market returns in small-cap, mid-cap, and emerging market
equities, as well as high-yield and emerging market bonds. Dudley and Nimalendran (2011)
find asymmetric correlation between hedge fund returns and returns on the equity index. Funds
with low returns are more likely to co-move with the equity market, indicating the possibility
of contagion risk among funds that face funding constraints.
Liquidity risk is also important in determining hedge fund performance and its market
impact. Sadka (2010) finds that systematic liquidity risk, measured by the Sadka illiquidity
measure, has a strong explanatory power for hedge fund returns. Teo (2011) reports significant
illiquidity risk premia; funds that are highly exposed to liquidity risk outperform those with low
liquidity risk exposure. Hu et al. (2013) use a liquidity measure based on the noise of Treasury
bond yields to capture the shortage of arbitrage capital in the economy. They show that this
illiquidity measure explains hedge fund returns in addition to traditional factors that are not
related to liquidity.
In the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis, the UK Financial Services Authority
(FSA), a body responsible for regulating financial industry in the UK between 2001 and 20133,
commissioned a series of reports in 2009–2010 to assess the systemic risk posed by hedge funds.
3The FSA was dissolved on the 1st of April 2013. It is replaced by two authority bodies, namely, the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).
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The FSA investigation focuses only on defaults of hedge funds and the resulting counterparty
risks that systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are exposed to. The FSA reports
conclude that hedge funds do not pose any systemic risk to the financial system and the wider
economy. This conclusion, however, may underestimate the influence of hedge funds, as it
neglects possible contagion effects and price impact of large hedge funds. In particular, as of
2012, the largest 1% of hedge funds controlled 38% of the assets in the hedge fund industry, with
90% of the assets being controlled by only the top 25% of funds according to the large merged
hedge fund database used in this paper. Large hedge funds are particularly important as they
are the alternative investment outlets for institutional investors (Joenvaara et al., 2014), and
they are becoming more interwoven with other large financial institutions (Billio et al., 2012).
3 Research Design and Hypotheses
3.1 Flow-induced price pressure
In this paper, we attempt to capture the link between hedge fund trading and changes in cor-
porate bond yields (measured by the Moody’s Baa yield) and changes in government bond
yields (measured by the 10-year Treasury bond yield). Since these assets are relatively risky
within their respective asset classes (Baa bonds are riskier than Aaa bonds, and 10-year Trea-
sury bonds are riskier than short-term bonds) hedge funds are likely to hold long positions in
these bonds.4 An increase in demand for these assets from hedge funds should lead to a decline
in their prices and, consequently, an increase in yields. Hedge fund bond portfolio holdings,
unfortunately, are not publicly available5 and direct inference is not possible.
We recognize, however, that upon fund inflow and outflow, hedge funds are more likely to
4Baa bonds have higher default risk than Aaa bonds. The corresponding average one-year default proba-
bilities are 0.29% and 0.00% respectively, according to Moody’s https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/
DefaultResearch/2007400000578875.pdf. Consequently, the average yield of Baa bonds in our sample of
7.11% per month is higher than that of Aaa bonds (6.13%). Similarly, 10-year Treasury bonds have longer
duration and higher interest rate risk than short-term bonds and notes. To compensate for this, 10-year Trea-
sury bonds yield on average 4.70% per year, whereas 3-month Treasury bills yield 3.05% for our sample periods
according to H.15 Release.
5Large hedge fund investment companies are required to disclose parts of their equity holdings (long positions
in U.S. equities and some option holdings) through SEC 13F filings. The information is available only for a
small number of hedge funds. The 13F reports are completed quarterly. The assets included in these filings
cover largely U.S. equity and do not include bond holdings. Thus, the 13F information is not suitable for the
current analysis.
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trade, especially when they encounter large withdrawal amounts from investors (Ben-David
et al., 2012). Flow-induced trading of mutual funds, for example, is examined in Coval and
Stafford (2007). The authors show that mutual funds respond to inflow (outflow) by increasing
(decreasing) the existing equity positions, creating additional price pressure. If hedge funds
behave alike, facing clients’ redemptions, fund managers may have to sell parts of their portfo-
lios, depressing market prices (and bond prices, in the context of our study) in the meantime.
A lower bond price is translated into a higher bond yield. The reverse effect may be observed
upon fund inflows. This leads to our first hypothesis on flow-induced price pressure in bond
markets.
H1: Hedge fund flow is negatively related to future changes in bond
yields.
To test this hypothesis, we regress changes in bond yields on changes in the lagged fund
flow.
What distinguishes this paper from previous research on fund flow is the usage of dollar flow
instead of conventionally used percentage flow. Percentage fund flow can adequately capture
neither the magnitude of trading activity nor the severity of market liquidity shocks. Consider
a simple example: compare two funds with $10 million assets under management (AuM) and
$1 million AuM respectively. Both funds experience outflows and need to sell 10% of their
bond positions immediately. The large fund will sell $1 million worth of bonds, whereas the
small one will sell only $0.1 million worth of bonds. The large fund is more likely to cause a
price impact by selling ten times more bonds than the small fund, despite the same percentage
outflow. Similarly, when aggregating the flow information across all hedge funds we chose to use
the sum of the individual dollar flows and not the average dollar flow to capture the magnitude
of fund inflow and outflows to/from the hedge fund industry.
DollarF lowi,t denotes the monthly net dollar flow at time t to individual hedge fund i:
DollarF lowi,t = AuMi,t − (1 +Ri,t)× AuMi,t−1 (1)
where Ri,t is the reported return of hedge fund i at time t, and AuMi,t represents the corre-
sponding assets under management. We then sum up all individual flows and scale the sum
7
by the U.S. GDP as at the end of the previous year to obtain the aggregate dollar flow in the
hedge fund industry, DollarF lowt. The scaling allows us to better capture the size of fund flow
relative to the economy and to control for inflation over the sample period.6
The challenge in identifying the impact of hedge fund trading using flow as a proxy is
that hedge fund flow contains different types of information. First, it proxies for hedge fund
trading activity, as upon inflow and outflow hedge funds are likely to rebalance their portfolios.
At the same time, fund flow captures the overall market conditions, funding liquidity, and the
amount of capital available for risky investments. Withdrawals may also be related to investors’
background risk, such as meeting personal liabilities.
To disentangle the trading impact of hedge funds from other types of information captured
by fund flow we use as a control variable the change in the “noise” measure of Hu et al. (2013).
This measure is based on the deviations of the observed prices of U.S. Treasury bonds from
their fitted values. It proxies for market-wide liquidity and captures the amount of the arbitrage
capital in the market. If flow-induced trading of hedge funds does not have any material impact
on bond yields, and fund flow simply reflects other investors’ liquidity needs, our DollarF lowt
measure should be insignificant in the presence of the noise measure.
We also use several additional control variables, including the average excess returns and
average percentage flows of bond-oriented mutual funds (as mutual funds actively participate
in bond markets), the CBOE VIX index and lagged bond yields as macroeconomic variables,
following Choi et al. (2010). We control for the effect of the financial crisis of 2007–2009 by
introducing a corresponding crisis dummy.7
6As a robustness check, in Section 6 we use two different types of scaling, namely, by the total size of
corporate bonds issues and by the size of Treasury bond issues during the year, and obtained qualitatively
similar results.
7As a robustness check we use dollar mutual fund flow scaled by the GDP instead of the percentage flow
to make them comparable to our flow specification for hedge funds. We also include a change in the Baa-Aaa
yield spread and a change in slope of the yield curve (the spread between 10-year Treasury bond and 3-month
treasury bill yields) as additional controls. The results remain qualitatively the same, and are discussed in
Section 6.
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Our baseline regression is as follows:
∆Y ieldt = β0 + β1 DCrisis + β2 ∆Y ieldt−1 (2)
+ β3 ∆V IXt + β4 ∆Noiset
+ β5 MFExRett−1 + β6 MFFlowt−1 + β7 HFExRett−1
+ γ ∆DollarF lowt−1 + εt
where Y ield is the Moody’s Baa yield or U.S. 10-year Treasury bond yield. DCrisis is a dummy
variable capturing the financial crisis. It takes a value of one between July 2007 and February
2009. V IX is the level of the CBOE VIX index. Noise is the noise measure of Hu et al.
(2013). Following Choi et al. (2010) and Hu et al. (2013), we use contemporaneous changes in
V IX and Noise to control for the amount of arbitrage capital available in the economy during
the evaluation period. MFExRet is the average excess return of bond-oriented mutual funds
over the risk-free rate. MFFlow is the average percentage flow to bond-oriented mutual funds.
HFExRet is the average excess return of hedge funds over the risk-free rate.8 DollarF low is
the aggregate hedge fund dollar flow. The flow to the hedge fund industry has been steadily
increasing over the sample period, resulting in DollarF low being a trending variable. To ensure
reliable inference, we use changes in DollarF low in the regression. In order to achieve a reliable
inference on statistical significance of the results, we estimate Newey–West heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation adjusted standard errors throughout all the regression specifications.
3.2 Fire sale (purchases) by hedge funds in illiquid markets
Ben-David et al. (2012) claim that (institutional) clients of hedge funds tend to withdraw
their money quickly when the market becomes turbulent, for fear that fund managers may
impose redemption restrictions (“raise the gates”) whenever they suffer heavy losses. Such
redemptions force hedge funds to liquidate their assets, and are likely to contribute to a liquidity
spiral (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), especially if market liquidity is already low. If
hedge funds face losses due to declining markets, and clients’ redemption force them to sell
8We use the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield obtained from the H.15 Release as the risk-free rate,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
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their holdings quickly, this further depresses market prices, leading to further losses and fund
outflows. Other financial institutions, such as pension funds that have stop-loss provisions in
their risk management systems, might join the run, spreading the fear of possible massive losses
and causing a liquidity drain-out.9 We expect the impact of fund flow on bond yields to be
more pronounced during turbulent market conditions when market liquidity is low.
H2: The negative relation between fund flow and bond yields is stronger
at times of declining market liquidity.
In order to test this hypothesis, we re-estimate Equation (2) including an interaction term
between changes in dollar fund flow and changes in the noise measure (∆Noise·∆DollarF low).
We expect the loading on this interaction to be negative and significant, especially for less liquid
corporate bonds.
3.3 Asymmetric effect on inflow and outflow
Fund flow, however, does not map one-to-one in the corresponding value of the assets immedi-
ately purchased or sold. The pressure on hedge funds to trade is expected to be higher upon
an outflow than upon an inflow. Upon an inflow, hedge fund managers are not required to im-
mediately purchase any assets, whereas in case of a sudden outflow they might need to rapidly
liquidate parts of their portfolios to meet redemption demand. Furthermore, outflow can lead
to a deleveraging of hedge funds, and the actual quantity of assets sold in this case will be
even higher than that implied by the net outflow. This is likely to happen during turbulent,
low liquidity periods in markets.10 At the same time, inflows are unlikely to lead to immediate
change in leverage. Hence, we expect fund outflow and inflow to have asymmetric impacts on
bond yields.
9Khandani and Lo (2007) and Khandani and Lo (2011) report that during the week of August 6, 2007,
when some multi-strategy funds and proprietary trading desks started to liquidate their equity portfolios to
stop further losses, such sudden liquidations had a profound impact on price levels, resulting in margin calls to
long-short equity hedge funds. This was then followed by pension funds’ decisions to withdraw their investments
from hedge funds, which put further pressure on the hedge fund industry and the financial markets. The chain
of events finally resulted in unprecedented losses of several high-profile quantitative long-short equity hedge
funds and substantial market price movements.
10Ang et al. (2011), for example, show that hedge fund leverage is time varying. It was declining from
mid-2007 and reached its lowest value in early 2009.
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H3: Inflow and outflow of hedge funds have different predictive power
for bond yields during times of high and low market liquidity.








DollarF lowi,t · IDollarF lowi,t<0
We include inflow and outflow separately in Equation (2) together with the product of a
chosen flow measure and ∆Noise. We change the sign of negative flows (outflows) to positive
for the ease of interpretation. We expect the loading on DollarInflow to be negative and the
loading on DollarOutflow to be positive.
3.4 Flow to the largest funds
Hedge funds are not uniformly distributed with respect to their size. The total assets under
management (AuM) of four hedge fund portfolios sorted by fund size one month before is
depicted in Figure 1. There is a substantial difference between the total AuM for all funds and
the total excluding the top 25%. This gap shows that a small group of the largest funds controls
the bulk of the assets in the hedge fund industry. Such high capital concentration suggests that
analysing a complete sample of hedge funds in relation to price impact, implicitly putting equal
weights on performance of all funds, may be misleading as it dilutes the impact of the top
funds that control 90% of the total assets. Further, the top 25% of funds are likely to attract
institutional investors, and their flows are expected to be larger in magnitude. Indeed, these
largest funds attract more than 83% of all monthly flows into the hedge fund industry. The
flows to top 25% and bottom 75% of funds are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of
0.79. At the same time, top funds attract on average 10 times larger flows than bottom funds
put together. Hence, the top 25% of funds is a good representative of the hedge fund sector.
H4: Flow of the top 25% of funds is a stronger bond yield predictor
than that of other funds.
11
Figure 1: Total AuM of the AuM-Sorted Portfolios
The figure plots the total AuM for four AuM-sorted portfolios from 1994 to 2012.
The solid line is the sum of the total AuM across all four portfolios. The dashed
line is the total AuM of all portfolios excluding the top 25% of funds. The dashed
and dotted curve represents AuM in the bottom two quartile portfolios, and the
dotted curve is the AuM of the portfolio containing the smallest 25% of funds.
To test this hypothesis, we further split flows into those generated by the largest 25% of
funds (“Top” funds) and the remaining funds (“Bottom” funds). We then repeat the complete
analysis described in previous sections using flow to Top and Bottom funds in turn.
3.5 Flow to bond-trend following hedge funds
Naturally, not all hedge funds engage in bond trading. By isolating those funds that do hold
bonds in their portfolio, one should be able to better gauge the price impact of their trading
activity on the bond market. Since bond holdings are not reported by even the largest hedge-
fund investment companies and reported fund styles may not be accurate, we resort to an
indirect inference of hedge fund investment style. For each hedge fund, we estimate a Fung and
Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model.11 We consider those funds with the loading on the bond-trend
following factor above the median to be bond-trend following funds and repeat the analysis using
flow to only this group of funds to test the following corollary:
Corollary: Flow to bond-trend following funds is a stronger predictor of future
yield changes than flow to other funds.
11The time series of the factors are generously provided by David A. Hsieh in his data library
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/ dah7/HFData.htm.
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3.6 Yield convergence in fixed-income arbitrage strategies
So far, we have discussed the potential impact of hedge fund trading on yields of bonds, which
are likely to be held long by hedge funds. Many hedge funds, however, are allowed to implement
long-short strategies. If they do so using various yield-arbitrage strategies, their flows will induce
changes in position in both long and short legs of the trade, affecting the spread. For such a
strategy, one would expect a negative relation between fund flow and the yield spread, which
drives strategy profitability. Upon an inflow, hedge funds purchase more of fixed income assets
on the long leg of a trade, pushing their prices up and yields down, while selling more assets
on the short leg of the trade has a reverse effect on prices and yield of the underlying bonds.
Combined together, the yields converge and the profitability of the strategy declines, which
leads to our final hypothesis:
H5: Flow to hedge funds is negatively related to future changes in the
yield spreads underlying fixed-income arbitrage trading strategies.
To test this hypothesis, we consider three often discussed trading strategies, in which hedge
funds can be potentially involved. These strategies are based on the relative mismatch of (1)
on-the-run and off-the-run treasury bond yields (Krishnamurthy, 2002); (2) constant maturity
swap rate and constant maturity treasury rate (Duarte et al., 2007); and (3) yields on TIPS
and treasury bonds (Fleckenstein et al., 2014).
For each of these strategies we define a yield spread S. The spread is the difference in yields
underlying the long and short legs of the trade, and it is the key driver of the profitability of
the corresponding strategy. We then relate the changes in the spread to the changes in fund
flow as in Equation 2. We also include additional strategy-related control variables. In what
follows, we detail the spread construction process for each of the trading strategies.
(1) On-the-run and off-the-run bond arbitrage
This trading strategy exploits the relative mispricing of on-the-run and off-the-run 30-year
Treasury bonds, as discussed in Krishnamurthy (2002). An arbitrageur short sells a new bond
upon its issuance at a spread of about 12 basis points (bps) to the “old”, off-the-run bond
and simultaneously purchases the old bond in order to bet on the spread. The position is held
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until the next auction date (usually in six months), and then it is unwound at a smaller spread
(potentially as small as 3 bps). The key driver of the strategy’s profitability is the spread in
yields between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds on the date of an auction and its decline over
time. We compute the spread S using 30-year Treasury bonds as
S = yieldoff-the-run − yieldon-the-run
.
(2) Swap spread arbitrage
We follow Duarte et al. (2007) in constructing this arbitrage strategy. An arbitrageur enters
into a par swap. They will receive a fixed coupon rate CMS (constant maturity swap rate)
and pay a floating rate (Libor). Simultaneously, they short a par Treasury bond with the same
maturity as the swap and invest the proceeds in a margin account earning the repo rate. On the
short bond position the arbitrageur pays the constant maturity treasury rate (CMT). Taken
together, the arbitrages receives the difference between CMS and CMT (which is fixed) and
pays the difference between Libor and repo rates (which is floating). Historically, however, the
floating part of the trade has been rather stable. Duarte et al. (2007) report the average spread
between Libor and repo rates of 26.8 bps with a standard deviation of only 13.3 bps. Hence,
the profitability of the strategy is primarily driven by the difference between CMS and CMT,
which is our spread, S, for this strategy:
S = CMS − CMT
(3) TIPS-Treasury bond arbitrage
The objective of this trading strategy is to exploit the relative overvaluation of Treasury
bonds as compared to Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), as described in Flecken-
stein et al. (2014). The exact strategy involves buying TIPS, entering into receiver inflation
swaps for each coupon date, purchasing STRIPS (Separate Trading of Registered Interest and
Principal of Securities) to match exactly the coupon payments, and short selling Treasury bonds
with the same maturity as TIPS. The main driver of the profitability of this strategy is the
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difference between the sum of STRIPS and TIPS yields and that of Treasury bonds. Thus, we
define the spread S as
S = yieldSTRIPS + yieldTIPS − yieldT-bond
When analysing the changes in S for this trading strategy in Equation 2, we use additional
control variables, following Fleckenstein et al. (2014). We include the total amount of Treasury
and TIPS outstanding to proxy for the supply of bonds, the ratio of total TIPS trading volume
by U.S. primary dealers to total coupon-bearing Treasury note and bond trading volume by
U.S. primary dealers to capture the relative liquidity of TIPS, and 10-year swap spread to proxy
for credit risk.
4 Data
4.1 Bond Yield Data
The 10-year Treasury yields and Moody’s Baa yields are obtained from the H.15 release. Panel
A of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the bond yields and their changes. Although
the mean Baa spread is 1.5 times larger than that of Treasury bonds (710.90 bps versus 470.14
bps), it has smaller standard deviation (108.89 bps versus 145.89 bps).
[Insert Table 1 around here]
4.2 Hedge Fund Data
We use a merged hedge fund database, which combines information from five mainstream hedge
fund databases (viz. BarclayHedge, EurekaHedge, Hedge Fund Research (HFR), Morningstar,
and TASS Lipper).12 The sample period covers 19 years from January 1994 to December
2012. It includes time-series data on monthly net-of-fees returns and AuM, as well as other
fund-related static information (such as fees, notice periods, etc.). While merging the data,
12This is an extended database used in Hodder et al. (2014).
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we follow the procedure of Joenvaara et al. (2016). In particular, we first merge management
companies based on their names, and then identify funds that are likely to be the same if they
belong to the same company and exhibit return correlation higher than 99% for overlapping
returns. For those funds that are found to report to more than one database, we choose the
record with the longest reporting history. Moreover, we use only hedge funds which report
returns in U.S. dollars.
Hedge fund databases are subject to various biases.13 To control for a backfill bias,14 we
delete the first 12 observations for each hedge fund. We only use funds with more than 24
remaining observations. We further exclude 21 monthly return data points in our sample that
were higher than 200% or less than -100%. Two hedge funds are removed from our sample due
to seemingly unrealistic AuM.15 The final sample contains 9,725 hedge funds.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the hedge funds in our sample. In
general, hedge funds produce a positive average monthly return of 0.61% with a standard
deviation of 4.29%. The average fund size is approximately $200 million, with a standard
deviation of $70 million. The high standard deviation in fund size indicates that funds faced
substantial inflow and outflows over the sample period. Half of the funds report the use of
leverage. The average management fee is 1.5% and the performance fee is around 17%. The
average lock-up period and notice period are both around one month.
To understand the distribution of the total assets managed by hedge funds, we split funds
into quartiles according to their average size. For each year, we form AuM-sorted portfolios.
The fund size statistics for each of the portfolios are reported in Table 2. Q1 is the portfolio
that includes the 25% of funds with the largest AuM, while Q4 includes the smallest 25% of
the funds. The statistics are reported for each of the 19 years, as well as for the whole sample
period.
The first column reports the total number of hedge funds in our sample for each year. The
13This includes, for example, self-selection, survivorship, backfill biases (Fung and Hsieh, 2000), as well as
deliberately smoothed (Getmansky et al., 2004) and/or misreported returns (Bollen and Pool, 2009).
14Fund managers can choose to “backfill” their past performance since inception when they join a database.
Such “backfilled” returns are normally reported if they reflect good track record (Fung and Hsieh, 2004).
15These two hedge funds are Athena Guaranteed Futures Ltd (TASS number 628) and LG Asian Smaller
Companies (TASS number 57686). The single AuM reported for these funds exceeds $300 billion, whereas the
total AuM of the rest of the hedge funds is less than $400 billion during the same period.
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number of funds increases steadily from 568 in 1994 and peaks at 5,357 in 2007. It drops
thereafter to the levels of 2003–2004, with 3,246 active funds in our dataset, as of 2012. The
smaller number of funds is due to investors’ withdrawals from hedge funds after substantial
losses incurred in the crisis period of 2007–2008, with many funds forced to liquidate due to
performance deterioration and the difficulty in maintaining fund operation.
Columns (2) to (5) of Table 2 report the mean and standard deviation of the AuM for the
four quartile portfolios, Q1 to Q4. There is a substantial difference between the largest and the
smallest funds in terms of their AuM. The average size of funds between 1994 and 2012 is $851
million for the Q1 portfolio, while that of the Q4 portfolio is just $0.2 million. This indicates
that the top 25% of funds are, on average, over 4,000 times larger than the bottom 25% of
funds. This difference decreases over time; it is likely to be driven by the increasing number of
funds. Importantly, the portfolio of the top 25% of funds controls as much as 89% of the total
AuM as of the end of 2012.
The last two columns of the table report the total AuM of hedge funds in our sample in USD
billion, and the AuM expressed as a percentage of the U.S. GDP as of the end of the previous
year. By the end of the sample period, the size of the industry reached 5.35% of the country’s
GDP.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of monthly dollar flow into hedge funds scaled by
the U.S. GDP as of the end of the previous year. We report the descriptive statistics of flow
to all hedge funds, and separately to bond-trend following funds. Remarkably, the top 25% of
hedge funds attract flows that are more than 10 times larger than the remaining 75% of funds.
Also, within each of the sub-groups (Top or Bottom funds), the outflow from funds with a short
notice prior to redemption is more than 10 times larger than that of funds with long notice
period. The average outflow from the industry is 8.99 bps of GDP per month. The average
outflow from the Top funds with a short notice period is 6.84 bps, equivalent to 76% of the
total outflow.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
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4.3 Fixed Income Arbitrage Strategies Data
To construct the off-the-run / on-the-run bond spread, we use the constituents of the 30-year
government bond index reported in Bloomberg, and use the corresponding ticker to locate an
on-the-run bond. When a member of the bond index is changed, we use the previous on-the-run
bond ticker as off-the-run bond, and the newly added ticker as an on-the-run bond to compute
the difference between the off-the-run and on-the-run bond yields.
To construct the Treasury-swap spread, we use constant maturity Treasury yields, as re-
ported in the H.15 release, and constant-maturity swap rates from Bloomberg. We use six
different maturities ranging from 3 months to 10 years. For most maturities, the data are avail-
able for the complete sample period from January 1994 to December 2012. For the 3-month
maturity, the data are available from 2004 onwards.
To construct the TIPS-Treasury spread, we obtain on-the-run Treasury bond yields, on-the-
run TIPS yields, and STRIPS from Bloomberg. The yields are reported for fixed, and not
constant maturity. Each month, we select the yields of the bonds with the closest maturity
to five and thirty years, and compute the difference between the sum of yields of STRIPS
and TIPS, and Treasury yield for these two maturities. The 5-year spread can be computed
from 1997 onwards, whereas the 30-year spread can be computed only from 2004 onwards, due
to earlier data not being available. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the obtained
spreads.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
4.4 Other Control Variables
Throughout the analysis, we use a set of additional control variables. The levels of the VIX
index are obtained from Bloomberg. The noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) is kindly provided
by Jun Pan on the author’s web-page.16 We obtain mutual fund data from the CRSP database.
The mutual funds’ investment strategies are restricted according to their mandates, which is
reflected in the reported fund styles. We use Fixed Income mutual funds only. In particular,
16http://www.mit.edu/ junpan/
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we choose corporate (CRSP Category Code: IC), government (CRSP Category Code: IG), and
money market (CRSP Category Code: IM) mutual funds, since these three types of mutual
funds focus exclusively on the U.S. bond markets, while others focus on different bond markets,
such as emerging markets. To minimize the impact of outliers, we winsorize mutual fund excess
returns and percentage flows at the 1% and 99% quantiles.
We obtain monthly values of the outstanding amount of TIPS and quarterly value of the
outstanding amount of Treasury bonds from Bloomberg.17 The ratio of TIPS to Treasury
trading volume by primary dealers is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
web-page. The 10-year swap spread is collected from Bloomberg. The spread between the
yields of Baa- and Aaa-rated bonds and the yield curve slope (the difference between 10-year
and 3-month Treasury yields) are computed using the corresponding yields reported in the H.15
release. Panel C of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of all the control variables.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Fund flows and bond yields
Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients between changes in dollar flow, changes in bond
yields, and other control variables. In general, changes in flows are negatively correlated with
changes in bond yields. The correlation coefficient between ∆DollarF low(t−1) and changes in
Baa yields of −0.17 is substantally larger in absolute value than that with changes in Treasury
bond yields of −0.01. We find that the change in noise (∆Noise) is highly correlated with
the change in Baa bond yields (0.48), suggesting that bond prices generally decline during
periods of low market liquidity. Fund flow itself is highly correlated with inflow and outflow.
The corresponding correlation coefficients are 0.85 and −0.89. This raises the concern regarding
multicollinearity, which we alleviate by using only one measure of flow at a time when estimating
our regressions.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
17Since the outstanding amount of Treasury bonds is available only on quarterly basis, in our regression
analysis we use linear interpolation to obtain monthly data.
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Table 6 reports the estimation results for Equation (2) for changes in the Treasury bond yield
(Panel A), and for changes in the Baa yield (Panel B). Model (1) uses only control variables,
Model (2) includes changes in hedge fund flow, and Model (3) also incorporates the interaction
between ∆Noise and ∆DollarF low. When including hedge fund flow, the adjusted R-square
increases from 9% to 11% for changes in Treasury yields, and from 22% to 23% for changes in the
Baa yields. Changes in hedge fund flow are negatively related to changes in both Treasury and
Baa bond yields, supporting our H1 of flow-induced price pressure. The coefficients of −0.322
and −0.273 are statistically significant at the 5% level. The trading pressure from hedge funds
is a viable predictor of the changes in bond yields even after we control for aggregate market
liquidity and the availability of arbitrage capital by using the ∆Noise.
In Model (3), the interaction between changes in noise and changes in flow is not statistically
significant for highly liquid Treasury bonds. It is, however, negative and highly significant for
changes in Baa yields. The result suggests that the negative impact of flow-induced trading of
hedge funds on bond yields is further amplified during periods of low liquidity. Such periods
are likely to be associated with increased selling pressure on bond markets. The results are
consistent with the intuition of H2 of fire trades of hedge funds occurring in turbulent times
and support the liquidity spiral theory of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
As for the economic significance of the results, the increase of fund flow by one standard
deviation (12.82 bps) leads to an additional decrease in the changes of Treasury bond yields
by −4.14 bps, and decrease in Baa yields of −3.60 bps. Furthermore, if fund flow changes
during turbulent times when noise increases by one standard deviation (2.40 bps), the changes
in Baa yields decrease by additional 5.60 bps. Such changes are economically relevant, given
the average monthly change in Treasury bond yield in our sample of −1.73 bps and that of Baa
of −1.29 bps.18
[Insert Table 6 around here]
In Table 6, Model (4) tests H3 using inflow, while Model (5) tests H3 using outflow. The
results suggest that the link between fund flows and changes in the Treasury bond yields is
largely driven by inflows. The corresponding coefficient of −0.641 is significant at the 5% level.
18We summarise the economic impact of flows from this and all the following regression in Table 8 at the end
of the current sub-section.
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The economic impact of that is that one standard deviation increase in inflow in hedge funds
leads to a decline in Treasury bond yield by 4.49 bps during the following month. This relation
is not affected by the total amount of arbitrage capital in the economy and market liquidity, as
the interaction term with the noise measure is not statistically significant. The results imply
that hedge funds are likely to invest in Treasury bonds upon inflow. This may reflect the short-
term “parking” of excess cash into Treasuries. Indeed, from our discussions with hedge fund
practitioners we learn that while implementing their investment strategy, hedge funds often
hold cash in their portfolio. The use and level of cash varies with investment style and what
assets the funds are invested in. Long-only funds, for instance, may retain cash out of tactical
considerations. Other styles hold more cash, as the instruments used, for example, forwards,
contracts for difference (CFD), options, only require partial funding. Any excess cash in a fund
is usually held as free cash or deposited in money market accounts with the fund’s custodian
or prime broker. If cash is invested and not held as free cash, it is usually invested in U.S.
Treasuries or money market funds with the focus on safety, not yield.19
The changes in Baa yields, however, react almost symmetrically on inflow and outflow.
The yield decreases upon inflow and increases upon outflow; both effects further amplified
during periods of low market liquidity. The impacts of inflow and outflow are also comparable
economically. One standard deviation increase in inflows leads to 2.79 bps decline in bond
yields, whereas one standard deviation increase in outflows lead to 3.14 bps increase in bond
yields.
The upper panel of Table 7 reports the results for inflow and outflow from Top and Bottom
funds (H4). Overall, the results are in line with the findings discussed so far, but flows to/from
Top funds have stronger statistical support consistent with H4.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
We now select those hedge funds that exhibit a higher than median loading on the bond-
trend following factor of Fung and Hsieh (2004). Such funds are likely to engage in bond
trading. The results in the bottom panel of Table 7 reveal that flows to/from such bond-trend
following funds can be indeed linked to changes in the yields of Baa bonds, but not to changes
19We would like to thank Stephan Schwill for his helpful comments.
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in Treasury bond yields. In fact, one standard deviation increase in the outflow from Top funds
results in 3.39 bps increase in Baa yields. An additional 6.15 bps increase in yield follows one
standard deviation outflow if the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) increases by one standard
deviation. These results corroborate our previous conclusion that hedge funds are likely to use
the Treasury bond market to (temporarily) allocate free cash upon an inflow. That link is not
specific to bond-trend following funds. At the same time, outflow induces funds to sell their
assets. Bond-trend following funds are more likely to actually hold large positions in corporate
bonds, and thus we do observe a significant link between outflow from bond-trend following
funds and Baa yield changes one month ahead.
Table 8 summarises the economic impact of one standard deviation change in flows of differ-
ent types on bond yields discussed so far, and reveals a noteworthy pattern. Fund flows predict
changes in both Treasury and corporate bond yields and are generally negatively related to
them. The effect of flow on the corporate bond market is further amplified during periods of
low market liquidity, when the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) increases. The effect on the
Treasury bond market, however, is independent of the level of market liquidity, as we do not
find a single case in which the product of ∆Noise and ∆DollarF low is statistically significant.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
5.2 Yield convergence in bond-arbitrage trading strategies
We now move to the analysis of the potential effect of hedge fund flow on the spreads of the
commonly used fixed-income arbitrage strategies. Table 9 reports the estimation results for the
spreads between the on-the-run and off-the-run 30-year Treasury bonds. Neither the chosen
control variables, nor changes in hedge fund flow have significant impact on changes in the
spread. The mean yield spread between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds during our sample
period is 5.32 bps, which is quite small to attract hedge fund interest. This might explain why
hedge fund trading does not to lead to convergence in the underlying bond yields.
[Insert Table 9 around here]
Table 10 reports the estimation results for the changes in the spread between constant
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maturity bonds and swap rates. Fund flow is significantly negatively related to changes in
spreads for all maturities from 2 to 10 years, apart from the shortest one of 3 months. The
mean Treasury-swap spread for the 3-month maturity is 49.7 bps, which is slightly higher than
the mean spreads for other maturities. At the same time its standard deviation of 47.43 bps
is more than twice the average standard deviations of other spreads, which are all around 22
bps. The uncertainty of the gains in this shortest maturity arbitrage strategy might explain the
lack of active hedge fund trading. The strongest statistical support is associated with 7-year
spreads, which provides a more favourable risk-return trade-off for hedge funds. The coefficient
of −0.115 for the total flow is highly significant. The effect is also significant for inflow and
outflow, as reported in Panels B and C of Table 10. Hedge funds seem to engage in the long-
short strategies betting on the Treasury-swap spread. Upon inflow, funds increase the scale of
the strategy. They short more Treasury bonds and enter into more receiver swaps, leading to a
decline in the difference between constant maturity swap rate and constant maturity treasury
rate.
[Insert Table 10 around here]
The results for the last trading strategy based on TIPS-Treasury spread are reported in
Table 11. We consider the spreads for 5- and 30-year maturities. The first column for each
maturity includes those control variables that are consistent with the ones used by Fleckenstein
et al. (2014). The second column additionally includes all other control variables from Equation
(2). With the limited control variables fund flow is significantly negatively related to changes in
TIPS-Treasury spread based on 5-year maturity, consistent with the result reported in Fleck-
enstein et al. (2014). The authors find that TIPS-Treasury mispricing narrows with changes in
total global hedge fund net asset values, as estimated by Hedge Fund Research Inc., and inter-
pret this result as supporting their slow-moving capital hypothesis. However, after controlling
for other yield determinants, including the noise measure, hedge fund flow is no longer signifi-
cant for 5-year maturity. This finding suggests that when other control variables are omitted,
hedge fund flow captures the overall market sentiment, market liquidity, and other factors that
can impact the spread. After controlling for these effects, the remaining flow-induced trading
impact on TIPS-Treasury spread based on 5-year maturity is negligible. At the same time,
the full specification indicates a strong statistical support for the link between fund flow and
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the TIPS-Treasury spread for 30-year maturity. The results are pronounced for total flow, as
well as for inflow and outflow. Flow-induced trading indeed leads to significant changes in the
profitability of the strategy and reduces relative mispricing. We thus conclude that hedge funds
do exploit TIPS-Treasury mispricing; however, they seem to focus on long-term bonds while
implementing this arbitrage strategy.
[Insert Table 11 around here]
6 Robustness checks
We perform several robustness checks to assess the stability of our results. We include new
control variables, use different scaling on hedge fund and mutual fund flow, assess the model
performance across different time periods, consider hedge funds with different lengths of notice
period prior to redemption and use the changes in yields of less risky bonds as alternative
test assets. Overall, the results are consistent with our main conclusions. We discuss all these
robustness checks below, and report the detail results in the supplementary online appendix.
We include two other control variables in the regressions. The first one is a lagged change
in the difference between Aaa and Baa bond yields to proxy for changes in credit spread. The
second one is a lagged change in the slope of the yield curve measured by the difference in the
yields of 10-year Treasury bonds and 3-month Treasury bills. We then include the interaction
between these variables and fund flow as additional controls in the regression. The changes slope
of the yield curve and the credit spread can capture relative profitability of bonds of different
types and may impact the likelihood of hedge funds directing their inflow into particular bonds.
The results are not qualitatively difference from the main results, with the additional controls
being either not statistically significant or only marginally significant.
To capture the variation of the impact of fund flow on bond yields depending on the market
liquidity, in our main analysis we use the interaction term between changes in fund flow and
changes in the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013). We now interact changes in flow with the
crisis dummy instead. The crisis dummy is a more crude measure than the noise measure used.
Not surprisingly, it is not statistically significant by itself, as reported in Table 6. We also do
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not find any strong statistical support for the interaction of the crisis dummy with changes in
flow. It is negative and only marginally significant for inflow, and it is not significant for total
flow or outflow.
In the main analysis, we use hedge fund flow scaled by the U.S. GDP as of the previous year.
We repeat the tests, scaling flows by the total amount of Treasury bond issued and Corporate
bond issued as of the previous year. The magnitude of the estimates does change due to the
different scaling of flows, but the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
To assess the stability of the results, we repeat the analysis for two sub-periods. The size
of the hedge fund industry has grown substantially since 2003 (see Figure 1), and so we may
expect more pronounced results in the later part of the sample. We split the sample into two
sub-samples of equal length: from January 1994 to June 2003, and from July 2003 to December
2012 and repeat the analysis for each of the sub-periods. The link between flows and future
changes in Treasury bond yield is significant during the second sub-period. As for the link
between flow and Baa yield changes, it is pronounced in both sub-periods. However, during the
first sub-period, it is the flow itself that is negatively related to yield changes, whereas during
the later sub-period, the impact of flow is significant only during times of declining market
liquidity.
One of the important contractual terms of hedge funds is a notice period prior to the re-
demption. Longer notice periods protect fund managers from the adverse consequences of
sudden fund outflows. Such funds have more time to raise funds and to oﬄoad their positions
if necessary. Hence, their outflow should be less informative for prediction of future changes in
bond yields. At the same time, flow-performance relation for funds with longer notice periods
is expected to be concave for low return regions (Ding et al., 2015). This is due to investor fear
of being “stuck” in an underperforming fund for longer period of time. Consequently, funds
with long notice periods may exhibit outflow earlier than funds with short notice periods if
the macroeconomic environment has just turned unfavorable to hedge funds. This can lead to
an opposite effect: that outflow from funds with long notice period have a stronger predictive
power for future changes in bond yields.
We divide funds into two groups according to the lengths of their notice periods. A long-
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notice group contains funds with notice periods longer than one month, and a short-notice
group includes funds with notice periods shorter than one month. We consider outflows from
funds with long and short notice periods separately and repeat the analysis in Equation (2)
including the interaction of flow and ∆Noise. Overall, we find that the economic impact on
the Baa yields of outflows from funds with long and short notice periods is similar.
One of the control variables we use in the regressions is percentage flow to bond mutual
funds. As a robustness check, we now use dollar mutual fund flow scaled by the GDP instead
to make it comparable to our flow specification for hedge funds. We find almost identical
results, with dollar mutual fund flows remaining not statistically significant, similar to their
percentage counterpart.
Our main analysis focuses on relatively risky Moody’s Baa and 10-year Treasury bond yields;
and our results are consistent with hedge funds having long positions in these assets and signif-
icantly contributing to their price changes. We repeat the analysis for less risky alternatives,
expecting the results to weaken if hedge funds indeed focus more on riskier assets. We use
changes in Moody’s Aaa yields and 3-month Treasury bill yields. Indeed, the relation weakens
substantially. Total fund flow has no significant impact on changes in 3-month Treasury bills
at all. The loadings on hedge fund flow have the same sign for Aaa yield changes as for Baa,
but the results have weaker statistical support. The adjusted R-square for changes in Aaa
bond yields is just 9% compared to 26% for Baa bond yields. Another key difference is that
the product of the noise measure and fund flow is not statistically significant for Aaa bonds,
implying that there is no additional effect of bond fire sale by hedge funds during turbulent
markets for highly rated bonds.
To more precisely identify the effect of hedge fund trading, one would need to use the
information on hedge fund bond holdings, which is not publicly available. We perform an
additional indirect check of the plausibility of our findings using the reported equity holdings of
hedge fund investment companies. We match 1,050 hedge fund investment companies from our
sample to those reporting equity holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
through the 13F filings.20 We then compare the net quarterly fund outflows and the changes
in reported equity holdings. We find that, for a median hedge fund company, its net quarterly
20This sample was previously used in Mattes (2011).
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outflow is $25 million larger than the corresponding changes in the value of the reported long
equity positions. As a result, to meet the redemptions, hedge funds seem to liquidate other
assets, together with equity, which may also include fixed income securities. This is consistent
with our hypothesis on flow-induced trading and the identified negative relation between flows
and future changes of bond yields.
7 Conclusion
Hedge funds are important market participants, which can invest in unconventional strategies,
take leverage, and short-sell. They invest not only in widely analysed equity markets, but are
heavily involved in more specialized fixed income trading too. The size of the industry was
above 5% of the U.S. GDP as of the end of 2012. Hedge funds generally trade for two distinct
reasons: portfolio rebalancing or accommodating new inflow and outflows. Since hedge fund
bond holdings are not directly observable, we cannot capture the portfolio rebalancing channel.
In this paper, we use hedge fund flows to proxy for the flow-induced trading.
We find that fund flow is negatively related to changes in 10-year Treasury bond yield and
Moody’s Baa yield one month ahead. The effect on Treasury bonds is related to fund inflow,
whereas both inflow and outflow lead to changes in the corporate bond yields, consistent with
the direct price impact.
The liquidity spiral theory of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) suggests that fund outflow
can lead to disproportional price decline in illiquid markets, when investor redemptions lead
to fire sales, further price decline, and new redemptions. In support of this conjecture, we find
the impact of fund flows on corporate bonds is amplified during periods of decreasing market
liquidity.
Hedge funds are not restricted to long only holdings, and hence we consider profitability
of several fixed income long-short arbitrage strategies. We do not find any link between fund
flow and on-the-run/off-the-run Treasury bond yield spread, suggesting that hedge funds may
not be engaging in this type of strategy to a large extent. TIPS-Treasury spread is negatively
associated with fund flows, consistent with Fleckenstein et al. (2014). However, when a larger set
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of controls is used in the regressions, fund flow remains highly significant for 30-year maturity,
but it loses its significance for 5-year maturity. This indicates that fund flow can be used
as a proxy of general market conditions and the amount of arbitrage capital in the economy,
and the hedge funds preference for trading riskier and more profitable long maturity bonds in
the Treasury markets. Further, fund flow predicts convergence in constant maturity Treasury
bond yield and swap rate, for all maturities from 2 to 10 years, making the corresponding
Treasury-swap spread arbitrage trading strategies less profitable. These findings indicate that
hedge funds do exploit arbitrage opportunities on fixed income markets. Flow-induced trading
predicts convergence of the underlying yield spreads and reduces mispricing.
Overall, we present strong statistical evidence that aggregate hedge fund flows (conditional
on their direction and fund size) predict bond yield changes, even after the changes in aggregate
market and funding liquidity are accounted for. This non-trivial price impact of hedge fund
trading in fixed income markets stems from the largest hedge funds. Hedge fund trading on
fixed income markets affects not only the investors in the funds, but also all other market
participants. Regulators may consider introducing mandatory reporting of bond positions by
the largest hedge-fund investment companies, akin to the already existing requirement of equity
holdings disclosure in 13F filings. This can make fixed income investments more transparent
and attractive for other investors, as the risk associated with the price movement due to hedge
fund trading can be better assessed.
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Table 1: Data Descriptive Statistics
The table reports the descriptive statistics of the data in our sample from 1994 to
2012. Panel A covers 10-year Treasury bond yields (TB10Y) and Moody’s Baa bond
yields (Baa) in basis points and their monthly changes (denoted by ∆). Panel B de-
scribes our hedge fund sample including fund return (Ret, in percent per month), as-
sets under management (AuM, in million USD), dollar flow (in million USD), usage
of a high-water mark (HWM), usage of leverage (Lev), management fee (MgmtFee
in percent), performance fee (PerfFee in percent), lock-up period (in months),
and notice period prior to redemption (in months). Panel C reports the descriptive
statistics of the control variables. MFExRet and MFFlow are monthly excess
return (in percent per month) and monthly flows (in percent per month) of fixed
income mutual funds in our sample. V IX is the CBOE VIX index. Noise is the
Hu et al. (2013) noise measure. TIPS OUT and TR OUT are the outstanding
amounts of TIPS and Treasury, respectively. TIPS\TR is the relative trading
volume by primary dealers in TIPS versus Treasury
Mean Median STD Skewness Kurtosis Min Max N obs
Panel A: Bond yields
TB10Y 470.14 462.50 145.89 -0.10 2.52 151.00 791.00 226
∆TB10Y -1.73 -1.00 27.66 0.01 4.02 -108.00 95.00 226
Baa 710.90 719.00 108.89 -0.22 2.29 445.00 954.00 226
∆Baa -1.29 -2.00 24.36 1.35 13.70 -96.00 169.00 226
Panel B: Hedge fund data
Ret (%) 0.61 0.57 4.29 0.46 17.21 -8.76 12.04 9,725
AuM ($M) 204.33 24.55 69.90 44.63 2,652.40 0.00 120,866.38 9,725
Dollar Flow ($M) 1.06 0.00 12.93 74.03 6,716.33 -633.52 2,955.34 9,725
HWM 0.74 1.00 0.44 -1.09 2.19 0.00 1.00 9,263
Lev 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.10 1.01 0.00 1.00 7,329
MgmtFee (%) 1.49 1.50 0.66 4.47 95.64 0.00 20.00 9,412
PerfFee (%) 17.43 20.00 6.76 -1.08 7.07 0.00 65.00 9,432
Lockup (Months) 0.91 0.00 3.88 6.34 62.08 0.00 84.00 9,725
Notice (Months) 0.60 0.00 1.70 4.98 32.01 0.00 18.00 9,725
Panel C: Control variables
MFExRet (%) -0.07 -0.15 1.06 -0.88 31.15 -17.69 12.13 746,336
MFFlow (%) 1.58 -0.20 13.58 3.06 20.73 -50.12 132.04 712,226
VIX 0.03 -0.17 4.47 0.80 4.78 -15.28 20.50 228
Noise (bps) 3.26 2.68 2.40 3.82 18.35 0.79 17.50 228
TIPS OUT ($Tril) 309.44 266.35 246.52 0.47 -1.13 7.36 849.84 191
TR OUT ($Tril) 5,890.75 4,578.02 2,494.17 1.44 0.81 3,772.27 12,822.90 228
TIPS \ TR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.18 -0.90 0.00 0.03 180
BaaAaa (bps) 98.34 87.50 46.50 2.94 11.01 53.00 343.00 228
Slope (bps) 165.35 160.00 120.31 -0.05 -1.15 -77.00 379.00 228
10YSwap (bps) 47.68 43.50 27.50 0.68 0.59 -1.63 135.90 228
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Table 2: Fund Size in the AuM-Sorted Portfolios
The table reports the fund sizes of the AuM-sorted portfolios. Each year, individual hedge funds are sorted into four groups according
to their average AuM in that year, with Q1 being a portfolio containing the largest 25% of funds, and Q4 containing 25% of smallest
funds. The table reports the mean and standard deviation of fund size for the four groups. The last row summarizes the mean and
standard deviation of fund sizes in the four groups based on the whole sample period. Columns (6) and (7) report the total size of
all hedge funds in our sample in billions USD and in percent relative to the U.S. GDP as of the end of the previous year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Q1 Portfolio Q2 Portfolio Q3 Portfolio Q4 Portfolio AuM AuM\GDP
# HFs Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD ($B) (%)
1994 568 1,223,513,045 68,990,602 1,977,502 158,878 1,202 24 104 4 183.53 2.51
1995 926 1,210,217,703 89,396,770 12,424,534 862,444 1,885 78 190 6 402.06 5.25
1996 1,223 1,170,648,271 53,096,383 14,583,655 974,309 3,072 92 224 11 507.61 6.27
1997 1,520 1,196,099,710 59,221,206 17,496,468 1,530,296 38,083 6,965 251 27 592.43 6.88
1998 1,851 984,154,683 69,120,522 20,018,866 775,031 295,381 30,021 294 9 582.86 6.41
1999 2,141 756,004,039 34,032,180 20,041,094 1,707,955 635,555 128,916 345 27 550.37 5.70
2000 2,437 745,543,933 36,795,969 24,684,867 701,009 1,058,664 51,684 407 7 598.80 5.82
2001 2,645 629,319,792 16,479,600 23,505,451 935,740 1,334,493 119,176 411 10 545.14 5.13
2002 2,988 539,148,163 15,299,916 27,113,238 791,127 1,941,527 94,010 447 6 437.86 3.99
2003 3,408 562,155,086 20,799,422 33,037,156 3,590,002 2,791,081 401,454 494 25 534.53 4.64
2004 4,217 591,940,387 24,768,790 43,308,295 1,789,890 5,042,767 404,465 659 11 757.65 6.17
2005 4,851 591,873,126 11,940,639 48,276,361 1,063,586 6,639,631 222,234 764 12 858.28 6.55
2006 5,226 652,891,424 23,455,859 53,623,011 1,525,327 8,043,559 301,303 879 18 1,011.98 7.30
2007 5,357 764,896,976 26,034,751 69,831,116 3,783,954 11,755,587 373,613 22,024 2,511 1,230.42 8.50
2008 5,312 720,124,108 78,358,851 68,544,418 8,746,034 13,750,687 1,325,637 261,605 278,589 1,119.85 7.61
2009 3,793 684,638,745 37,373,966 71,383,218 3,282,630 22,227,231 1,168,847 4,970,341 219,424 754.46 5.23
2010 3,770 768,040,815 24,825,794 79,158,017 2,209,869 24,628,344 1,143,087 5,178,496 132,222 874.73 5.85
2011 3,667 849,632,928 28,955,985 80,477,280 3,518,060 25,426,187 1,370,989 5,202,161 306,285 924.85 5.96
2012 3,246 876,056,229 12,581,056 80,097,672 1,644,673 23,588,856 830,827 4,709,889 151,768 863.78 5.35
1994-2012 9,725 851,115,652 282,150,463 52,385,262 8,841,584 11,131,490 924,529 198,704 348,819
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Table 3: Dollar Fund Flow (Scaled by GDP): Descriptive Statistics
The table reports the mean and standard deviation (STD) of monthly dollar flow
into the hedge fund industry expressed in basis points (bps) of the U.S. GDP.
“Bond HFs” stands for those hedge funds with the above median loading on the
bond-trend following factor of Fung and Hsieh (2004). “Flow” is a net dollar flow
into the funds, “Inflow” and “Outflow” are positive and negative constituents of the
net flow, respectively. “Top” stands for the largest 25% of funds. “Bottom” stands
for the remaining 75% of funds. “Long (Short) Notice” indicates funds with the
notice period prior to redemption longer (shorter) than one month.
All HFs Bond HFs
Mean STD Mean STD
Flow 3.01 12.82 1.56 7.51
Inflow 12.00 7.00 6.52 4.27
Outflow 8.99 9.07 4.96 4.72
Top Inflow 9.97 6.07 5.33 3.81
Top Outflow 7.27 7.03 3.91 3.62
Bottom Inflow 0.94 0.73 0.46 0.34
Bottom Outflow 0.61 0.75 0.29 0.33
Top, Long Notice, Out 0.43 0.58 0.19 0.33
Top, Short Notice Out 6.84 6.58 3.72 3.48
Bottom, Long Notice, Out 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.03
Bottom, Short Notice Out 0.57 0.69 0.27 0.30
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Table 4: Fixed Income Spreads: Descriptive Statistics
The table reports the descriptive statistics of yield spreads underlying three fixed income arbitrage strategies, expressed in basis
points (bps). We use (1) Off-the-run/on-the-run bond yield spread, (2) Treasury-swap spread, and (3) TIPS-Treasury spread. The
detailed strategy description can be found in Section 3.6.
Mean Median STD Skewness Kurtosis Min Max N obs Data span
Off-the-run/on-the-run spread 30-year 5.32 4.90 4.86 0.38 -0.73 -3.00 18.20 228 1994–2012
3-month 49.70 33.97 47.43 2.70 9.51 12.73 312.57 110 2003–2012
2-year 39.23 35.50 21.14 1.43 3.18 9.45 144.70 228 1994–2012
Treasury-swap spread 3-year 44.63 40.18 22.71 1.26 2.40 9.99 146.45 228 1994–2012
5-year 46.41 41.50 22.18 0.86 -0.00 10.60 110.73 228 1994–2012
7-year 43.16 39.50 22.02 0.78 0.20 4.10 111.30 228 1994–2012
10-year 45.79 42.50 27.54 0.67 0.63 -4.65 134.10 228 1994–2012
TIPS-Treasury spread 5-year 174.75 165.61 159.79 -0.18 -0.93 -148.48 421.20 186 1997–2012
30-year 180.40 195.35 59.17 -1.03 0.79 30.72 315.87 105 2004–2012
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Table 5: Factor Correlations
The table reports the correlation coefficients over the sample period from 1994 to 2012 between various variables used in this study.
∆ indicates monthly changes. Baa is the Moody’s Baa yield, TB10Y is the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield. V IX is the CBOE VIX
index, MFExRet is the excess return of bond-oriented mutual funds, MFFlow is the percentage fund flow of bond-oriented mutual
funds, HFExRet is the excess return of hedge funds, DollarF low is hedge fund flow scaled by the U.S. GDP. DollarInflow is the
aggregate dollar inflow and DollarOutflow is the aggregate dollar outflow, both scaled by the U.S. GDP.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) ∆ Baa (t)
(2) ∆ TB10Y (t) 0.64
(3) ∆ VIX (t) 0.23 -0.17
(4) ∆ Noise (t) 0.48 0.07 0.37
(5) MFExRet(t-1) -0.04 0.06 -0.08 -0.05
(6) MFFlow(t-1) 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 0.11 -0.41
(7) HFExRet(t-1) -0.07 0.19 0.03 -0.15 0.56 -0.51
(8) ∆ DollarFlow(t-1) -0.17 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 0.08 -0.20 0.53
(9) ∆ DollarInflow(t-1) -0.09 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 0.04 -0.14 0.53 0.85
(10) ∆ DollarOutflow(t-1) 0.20 0.01 0.08 0.17 -0.09 0.21 -0.40 -0.89 -0.51
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Table 6: Hedge Fund Dollar Flow
The table reports the results based on total hedge fund flow, as well as inflow and outflow from 1994 to 2012. Baa is the Moody’s
Baa yield, TB10Y is the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield. DCrisis is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 from July 2007 to February
2009, or 0 for the rest of the sample period. Lag1 is the previous value of the corresponding dependent variable. V IX is the CBOE
VIX index, Noise is the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013), MFExRet is the excess return of bond-oriented mutual funds, MFFlow
is the percentage fund flow of bond-oriented mutual funds, HFExRet is the excess return of hedge funds, and DollarF low is hedge
fund flow scaled by the U.S. GDP as of the end of the previous year. ∆ indicates monthly changes in the corresponding variable.
Newey-West t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: ∆TB10Y Panel B: ∆Baa
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Total flow Total flow Inflow Outflow Total flow Total flow Inflow Outflow
Const 0.0010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.84] [0.71] [0.69] [0.68] [0.78] [-0.05] [-0.14] [-0.41] [-0.22] [-0.40]
Crisis Dummy -0.0010 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[-0.89] [-0.60] [-0.59] [-0.53] [-0.75] [0.30] [0.71] [0.62] [0.84] [0.39]
Lag 1 0.1150 0.084 0.084 0.093 0.097 0.1050 0.093 0.075 0.095 0.070
[1.96] [1.35] [1.32] [1.49] [1.59] [1.37] [1.15] [0.89] [1.26] [0.79]
∆VIX -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[-2.69] [-2.89] [-2.86] [-2.66] [-2.85] [0.42] [0.37] [0.22] [0.32] [0.21]
∆Noise 6.372*** 6.162*** 6.024*** 6.208*** 6.135** 11.278*** 11.152*** 9.678*** 10.684*** 9.609***
[2.76] [2.84] [2.66] [2.85] [2.58] [3.47] [3.60] [3.59] [3.86] [3.45]
MFExRet (t-1) -0.0080 -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 -0.015 0.0010 -0.010 -0.013 -0.007 -0.009
[-0.51] [-1.33] [-1.33] [-1.31] [-0.89] [0.07] [-0.65] [-0.90] [-0.48] [-0.67]
MFFlow (t-1) 0.0030 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.0040 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.003
[0.29] [0.18] [0.19] [0.55] [0.09] [0.51] [0.52] [0.57] [0.81] [0.33]
HFExRet (t-1) 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.032*** 0.0040 0.015 0.017 0.013 0.011
[2.89] [3.28] [3.30] [3.19] [3.20] [0.43] [1.33] [1.43] [1.11] [1.19]
∆Noise × ∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.017 -0.119 0.008 -0.182*** -0.513** 0.218***
[-0.36] [-0.50] [0.15] [-3.98] [-2.35] [3.21]
∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.322** -0.323** -0.641** 0.289 -0.273** -0.281** -0.398* 0.346*
[-2.23] [-2.24] [-2.16] [1.56] [-2.00] [-1.99] [-1.87] [1.72]
R-sqr 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.28
Adj. R-sqr 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.25
N 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226
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Table 7: Inflow and Outflow from Top and Bottom Funds
This table reports the results based on inflow and outflow from Top and Bottom funds separately from 1994 to 2012. Top funds
are the largest 25% of hedge funds and Bottom are the remaining hedge funds. Baa is the Moody’s Baa yield, TB10Y is the U.S.
10-year Treasury yield. Noise is the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013), and DollarF low is hedge fund in- or outflow scaled by the
U.S. GDP as of the end of the previous year. ∆ indicates monthly changes in the corresponding variable. The upper panel is based
on all hedge funds. The lower panel is based on flows to hedge funds with higher than median loading on the bond-trend following
factor of Fung and Hsieh (2004). Newey-West t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and
1% level, respectively.
Panel A: ∆TB10Y Panel B: ∆Baa
Inflow Outflow Inflow Outflow
Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom
All hedge funds
∆Noise × ∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.144 -6.368 0.018 0.579 -0.552** -8.415* 0.286*** 4.896
[-0.44] [-1.35] [0.29] [0.29] [-2.06] [-1.68] [2.90] [1.27]
∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.703** -9.265* 0.591* -0.083 -0.359 -6.834* 0.503 2.403
[-2.00] [-1.85] [1.71] [-0.01] [-1.55] [-1.96] [1.40] [0.76]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-sqr 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.26
Adj. R-sqr 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.23
N 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226
Bond-trend following hedge funds
∆Noise × ∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.036 -14.121 0.159 0.394 -0.530 -22.909** 0.708*** 13.504
[-0.06] [-1.53] [0.87] [0.09] [-1.14] [-2.42] [3.19] [1.48]
∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.815* -15.218 0.854 7.608 -0.364 -12.209* 0.936* 8.337
[-1.82] [-1.31] [1.52] [0.66] [-1.25] [-1.68] [1.77] [1.22]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-sqr 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.27
Adj. R-sqr 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.24
N 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226
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Table 8: Economic Impact of Fund Flows on Bond Yields
The table reports the expected economic impact (in basis points) on changes in
the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield (TB10Y ) and the Moody’s Baa yield (Baa) by one
standard deviation increase in hedge fund monthly dollar flow (DollarF low) and
one standard deviation increase in dollar flow together with one standard deviation
increase of the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) (Noise&DollarF low). Top funds
are the largest 25% of hedge funds and Bottom are the remaining hedge funds.
Panel A: ∆TB10Y Panel B: ∆Baa
1 STD change in: DollarFlow Noise & DollarFlow Noise &
DollarFlow DollarFlow
Flow -4.14 – -3.60 -5.60
Inflow -4.49 – -2.79 -8.62
Outflow – – 3.14 4.75
Top Inflow -4.27 – – -8.04
Bottom Inflow -6.76 – -4.99 -14.74
Top Outflow 4.15 – – 4.83
Bottom Outflow – – – –
Top Outflow, Long Notice 3.55 – – 4.71
Top Outflow, Short Notice – – – 4.93
Bond HFs, Inflow, Top -3.11 – – –
Bond HFs, Inflow, Bottom – – -4.15 -18.69
Bond HFs, Outflow, Top – – 3.39 6.15
Bond HFs, Outflow, Bottom – – – –
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Table 9: On-the-run/ Off-the-run Bond Spread
The table reports the estimation results of the regression for the changes in the
spread between on-the-run and the most current off-the-run 30-year bond yields.
The control variables are the ones used in Table 6. DollarF low is hedge fund flow
scaled by the U.S. GDP as of the end of the previous year. “Total” indicates that
total net dollar flow is used, “Inflow” and “Outflow” indicate the use of inflow and
outflow respectively. ∆ indicates monthly changes in the corresponding variable.
Newey-West t-statistics are reported in brackets. *,**,*** indicate significance at
the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
Total flow Inflow Outflow
Const 0.000 0.000 0.000
[1.05] [1.01] [1.09]
Crisis Dummy -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[-0.80] [-0.72] [-0.90]
Lag 1 0.007 0.007 0.008
[1.49] [1.46] [1.58]
∆VIX 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.63] [0.66] [0.66]
∆Noise 0.103 0.104 0.107
[0.70] [0.72] [0.73]
MFExRet (t-1) 0.002 0.002 0.002
[1.25] [1.08] [1.47]
MFFlow (t-1) 0.002 0.002 0.002
[1.23] [1.32] [1.25]
HFExRet (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
[-0.45] [-0.13] [-0.69]
∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.003 -0.016 -0.004
[-0.26] [-0.70] [-0.29]
R-sqr 0.03 0.03 0.03
Adj. R-sqr -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
N 226 226 226
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Table 10: Constant Maturity – Swap Spread
The table reports the estimation results of the regression for the changes in the
spread between constant maturity swap rate and constant maturity Treasury rate.
3-month, 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-, and 10-year tenors are used. The control variables are those
used in Table 6. DollarF low is hedge fund flow scaled by the U.S. GDP as of
the end of the previous year. “Total flow” indicates that total net dollar flow is
used, “Inflow” and “Outflow” indicate the use of inflow and outflow respectively. ∆
indicates monthly changes in the corresponding variable. Newey-West t-statistics
are reported in brackets. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level,
respectively.
3-month 2-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year
Panel A: Total flow
Const -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
[-0.44] [-1.92] [-1.79] [-1.69] [-1.51] [-1.13]
Crisis Dummy -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[-0.36] [0.53] [0.34] [0.37] [-0.31] [-0.21]
Lag 1 -0.363*** -0.273*** -0.109 -0.165** -0.166* -0.137
[-2.91] [-3.68] [-1.21] [-2.09] [-1.94] [-1.63]
∆VIX 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
[1.06] [2.06] [2.48] [2.62] [3.30] [1.45]
∆Noise 2.856 1.793 2.178** 1.608* 1.284** -0.113
[0.67] [1.55] [2.53] [1.82] [2.02] [-0.13]
MFExRet (t-1) -0.007 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.012**
[-0.29] [-3.12] [-3.92] [-2.60] [-3.11] [-2.51]
MFFlow (t-1) -0.016 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
[-0.71] [-0.83] [-0.43] [-0.46] [-0.21] [-0.43]
HFExRet (t-1) -0.005 0.008** 0.010*** 0.007* 0.011*** 0.010***
[-0.20] [2.15] [2.76] [1.90] [3.09] [2.81]
∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.203 -0.108** -0.086** -0.068* -0.115*** -0.121**
[-0.81] [-2.11] [-2.33] [-1.82] [-3.14] [-2.54]
R-sqr 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.10
Adj. R-sqr 0.10 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.07
N 116 226 226 226 226 226
Panel B: Inflow
∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.558 -0.151 -0.181 -0.078 -0.167* -0.302***
[-1.56] [-1.41] [-1.61] [-0.78] [-1.84] [-3.25]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R-sqr 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.10
Panel C: Outflow
∆DollarFlow (t-1) 0.111 0.130 0.066 0.092 0.133** 0.076
[0.22] [1.60] [0.95] [1.60] [2.16] [0.98]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R-sqr 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.04
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Table 11: TIPS–Treasury Spread
The table reports the estimation results of the regression for the changes in the
spread between STRIPS plus TIPS and Treasury yields with fixed maturity. 5- and
10-year tenors are used. The control variables are those used in Table 6 as well as
those described in sub-section 3.6. DollarF low is hedge fund flow scaled by the
U.S. GDP as of the end of the previous year. “Total flow” indicates that total net
dollar flow is used, “Inflow” and “Outflow” indicate the use of inflow and outflow
respectively. ∆ indicates monthly changes in the corresponding variable. Newey-
West t-statistics are reported in brackets. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10,
5, and 1% level, respectively.
5-year 30-year
Panel A: Total flow
Const -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 0.000
[-2.26] [-0.22] [-0.61] [0.51]
Crisis Dummy -0.000 0.001
[-0.35] [1.23]






MFExRet (t-1) -0.002 -0.013
[-0.09] [-0.52]
MFFlow (t-1) -0.020* -0.019
[-1.68] [-0.88]
HFExRet (t-1) -0.000 0.032*
[-0.00] [1.81]
Treasury Outstanding -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005
[-0.79] [-0.66] [-0.85] [-1.34]
TIPS Outstanding 0.087*** 0.081*** 0.031 0.034*
[3.37] [3.22] [1.50] [1.97]
TIP/Treasury Trading -0.045 -0.032 0.038 0.029
[-1.03] [-0.69] [0.97] [0.75]
Swap Spread 0.544 0.564 -0.740 -1.056**
[1.61] [1.59] [-1.31] [-2.49]
∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.224* -0.212 -0.182 -0.453**
[-1.88] [-1.45] [-1.55] [-2.42]
R-sqr 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.26
Adj. R-sqr 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.16
N 179 179 104 104
Panel B: Inflow
∆DollarFlow (t-1) -0.318* -0.241 -0.165 -0.704**
[-1.82] [-0.96] [-0.93] [-2.42]
Controls yes yes yes yes
Adj. R-sqr 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.13
Panel C: Outflow
∆DollarFlow (t-1) 0.330 0.282 0.374 0.590**
[1.53] [1.50] [1.53] [2.02]
Controls yes yes yes yes
Adj. R-sqr 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.14
42
